Back in August, when gross federal debt crossed $40 trillion, Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent said we could “grow our way out of that.” At the time, I estimated that real GDP would have to grow by roughly 4 percent a year just to keep federal debt held by the public near 100 percent of GDP. That estimation was based on generous assumptions about the rate of growth in public debt over time.
An OECD working paper published in September takes up a question that I left open. How much would faster would a booming economy reduce the need to borrow? Economist Yvan Guillemette finds that a 10 percent increase in employment would close about 30 percent of the U.S. fiscal gap by 2060. Getting the same additional output from a more productive workforce would barely narrow it.
Guillemette looks at 35 countries and asks how much each would need to raise revenue or restrain spending by 2060 to keep gross public debt close to its projected 2027 share of GDP. He assumes governments continue to provide public services and retirement benefits at today’s standards. The gap between what these services and benefits cost and what the government can actually afford while keeping the debt ratio stable is known as the fiscal gap.
For the median country, the fiscal gap sits at 4.7 percent of GDP. For the United States, including federal, state and local governments, the estimate is around 7.5 percent. In other words, by 2060 we would need annual cuts in spending or new revenues equivalent to $7.50 for every $100 the economy produces, simply to hold the debt ratio steady.
A large share of the increase in spending is driven by pension spending. Across the countries studied, the median increase in pension spending through 2060 is 2.2 percentage points of GDP, while for health and long-term care, it is 1.8 points. For the United States, the deficit we already run before interest costs (initial structural deficit) matters even more over the next two decades.
If underlying revenues stay at their 2027 share of potential GDP and spending follows its projected path, net government debt in the U.S. rises by 124 percentage points of GDP by 2045. Over those 18 years, simply carrying forward the initial U.S. primary deficit adds more to our debt than the projected increases in pension, health and long-term care spending combined.
Guillemette models two scenarios under which the economy could end up 10 percent larger than forecasted in 2060. Both scenarios add about 0.3 percentage points to average annual growth from 2028 to 2060. In the first case, workers produce more per hour. Their wages rise and the government collects more tax revenue. So why does the fiscal gap barely change?
Consider how Social Security calculates changes in benefits over time. Someone already collecting Social Security receives an annual adjustment tied to the rate of inflation. But when a worker retires, the Social Security Administration adjusts past earnings for growth in national average wages to calculate the initial benefit. Faster wage growth today brings in more payroll tax revenue, but it also means higher starting benefits for future retirees.
Guillemette assumes that the average public pension keeps pace with average wages. Wages also rise for people providing publicly funded services. A publicly funded nursing home still must pay enough to keep its nurses as wages elsewhere rise, even if it takes just as many hours to care for a resident. Higher wage bills and more generous pensions mean that a large share of the additional revenue is already spoken for.
In the second case, employment rises 10 percent above baseline with the same working-age population. There are more people earning taxable income for each retiree drawing a pension. In this case, the U.S. gap falls by roughly 2.2 points, or just under 30 percent of the long-run fiscal gap.
Both scenarios assume the reforms that generate the extra growth cost the government nothing. If Congress were to subsidize firms to hire the additional workers, then the cost would eat into those savings. Guillemette also assumes that interest rates eventually rise on pace with faster growth. If borrowing costs increased at a slower pace, productivity growth would do somewhat more for the budget.
One reform that the author offers is a gradual increase in Social Security’s full retirement age. In a separate OECD simulation, raising the statutory retirement age by 1 year by 2035, on top of changes already in law, reduces the median fiscal gap by 0.4 percent of GDP. Some older workers stay on the job longer, and pension spending grows more slowly.
Another option is to slow the growth of Social Security benefits by switching the benefit indexation from wage to price indexation. Under that approach, a larger share of the revenue from wage growth would help cover the program’s existing shortfall. Specifically, this reform would reduce the U.S. long-run fiscal gap by nearly 3 percent of GDP, closing nearly 40 percent of the shortfall.
In all, a combination of slower growth in benefits (through changes to indexation), raising the retirement age by 1 year, and by some miracle, raising the employment rate by 10 percent, would collectively close about 70 percent of the long-term fiscal gap in the United States.
If we’re to get serious about addressing our long-term fiscal imbalance, slowing the growth of government entitlement spending, especially age-related programs, must be a priority going forward.


Does anyone from either party get elected by explaining the math or the tradeoffs?
As Tom Sowell said, the first rule of economics is scarcity: everybody can't have everything. And the first rule of politics is to disregard the first rule of economics.